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Constitutive Relations: A Philosophical Anthropology 
Lyubov Bugaeva and John Ryder 
This is an essay in philosophical anthropology that explores two themes: 1) an understanding of human 
being as relationally constituted, and 2) the constitutive role of absence in human being. The authors 
present and explore the general ideas of the American philosopher Justus Buchler and their intersection 
with those of Nicholas Rescher, Jacques Lacan, Helmuth Plessner, Arnold Gehlen. The authors contend 
that a relational conception of human being is both plausible and desirable, and that absence or lack is a 
distinctive constitutive feature of human being.  
 
Introduction 
 It is a truism, and on the face of it a rather vacuous one, that societies consist, 
among other things, or people in various relations with one another. Though obvious 
enough, this point does suggest that if we are to engage the many philosophical issues 
concerned with society and social theory, we invariably need some conception of human 
being, which is to say we need some understanding of what it is to be a person. A society 
will be understood quite differently if, for example, we choose to understand persons as 
themselves inherently relational entities rather than, as Adam Smith and many others 
have, as atoms interacting with one another in private and public spheres. 
This essay is an exploration of a relational understanding of human being, by 
which we mean a point of view in which human beings are relationally constituted. In 
Part I we will describe a general ontology of constitutive relations, as well as what we 
can call a relational metaphysics of human being. Part II is an illustration of a relational 
view of human being through the consideration of a specific kind of human trait. The 
relational constitution of human being, we suggest, is evident in the role of absence in 
human nature. 
Part I 
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Relationality and Human Being 
An Ontology of Constitutive Relations 
 The idea that human being, or human nature if you will, is relationally constituted 
is a specific application of the more general idea that everything is relationally 
constituted. We will begin with this latter, more general point, which is to say that we 
begin with a description of a general ontology of constitutive relations. Once this general 
idea is described it will be possible to explore its implications for an understanding of 
human being. 
 The history of philosophy is dominated by the idea that although in experience 
there is ample evidence of relations among entities, behind, or underneath, those relations 
is something non-relational. For Platonic idealism it is eternal forms, for Aristotelianism 
in its many forms it is substance, and for modern rationalism and empiricism it is also 
substance in one or another of its versions. For Berkeley it is mind, and for Hegel it is 
Absolute Spirit. With few exceptions, those who were inclined to reject the existence or 
knowledge of a non-relational substratum were driven to a more or less serious 
skepticism. Hume comes to mind as an example of one form of such skepticism. By the 
20th century in British philosophy, for example in Russell, talk of substance gave way to 
an assumption of some variety of monadism. And in another strain of thought, I have the 
later Wittgenstein in mind, the attempt to describe the general character of entities was 
abandoned altogether. Rarely, however, has the possibility been entertained that what 
exists, that is anything at all, can be usefully understood as relational in its nature. On the 
contrary, it was usually taken for granted that if there are relations in reality, then there 
must be absolute entities of some kind that stand in relation. As the early Wittgenstein put 
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it in an implied but striking non sequitur, the simple is implied by the complex, so that 
the existence of the simple object is a logical necessity (Wittgenstein 1969, 60). In this he 
was following Leibniz, who put it rather starkly: if there are simples there must be 
complexes (Leibniz 1986, 251). 
 By contrast to this dominant trend in the history of European philosophy, we want 
to propose that whatever is, in any sense or way at all, is in its nature complex, and 
complex in such a way that its nature is constituted by the relations among its traits, and 
that its traits, whatever they are, are themselves relationally constituted complexes. This 
is a complicated proposition, which we will now unpack.1 The idea, again, is that 
everything, by which we mean material objects, ideal entities, histories, ideas, dreams, 
fictional characters, logical principles, actualities, possibilities, God, human being, and 
anything else one can mention or point to, whether a human product or not, is constituted 
by its traits and the relations among them. The details of an ontology of constitutive 
relations, as we will call this general idea, can be described both positively and 
negatively, i.e. both by what it means and what it does not mean. We will begin with a 
negative description. 
 Any entity of any kind whatsoever, let us use the term “complex” as the term with 
the widest possible scope, is constituted by the relations among its traits. It is important to 
understand that a trait is not to be understood as contained in a complex, nor is a complex 
to be understood as a container of traits. The traditional distinction between internal and 
external traits is misleading. Traits are neither internal nor external, neither “contained 
in” a complex nor outside of it. Rather they are more or less strongly constitutive of the 
complex. Some traits of a complex are parts of the complex, but not all are. The root 
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system of a plant, for example, is a part of the plant and a constitutive trait. But the 
chemical characteristics of the plant’s physical environment are not parts, yet they are 
constitutive traits of the plant in that they are directly related to the plant’s health and its 
activities. The metaphors of a complex as container or as a collection of parts must be 
given up if we are to understand an ontology of constitutive relations. 
 The tendency to understand a complex as a container has given rise to another 
common idea that must be rejected. It is often asserted, or at least implicitly accepted, 
that everything that exists constitutes a whole of some kind, for example creation as a 
whole, or the “whole of nature.” Sense can be given to such expressions if one is careful. 
It is possible to speak of the whole of nature, for example, if by that expression one 
means simply everything that “is” in a distributive sense. But it is senseless to speak of 
nature as a whole if one means a whole system of nature. A relational ontology neither 
assumes nor implies an overarching, integrated system of complexes, or a sense of nature 
or reality in which everything is related to everything else. There are complexes, 
innumerable ones at that, and each is constituted by its relations, but there is no reason to 
think that each is constitutively related to all the others. There is not, in other words, a 
whole of nature in the sense of one big complex.2
 It has also been common in the history of philosophy to regard some things as 
“more real” than other things: parts more real than a whole, or the whole more real than 
its parts; traits more real than a complex, or a complex more real than its constituent 
traits; causes more real than effects, or effects more real than their causes; the physical 
more real than the ideal, or the ideal more real than the physical; the actual more real than 
the possible, or the possible more real than the actual; the fictional more or less real than 
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the non-fictional. In a view that will have important implications for an understanding of 
human nature, an ontology of constitutive relations accepts no claim to ontological 
priority, i.e. that something is more real than something else. On the contrary, a relational 
ontology assumes an ontological parity among all complexes of every kind. To say that a 
complex is more or less real than its constituents would in fact be self-contradictory, 
since all constituent traits are themselves complexes, and all complexes are themselves 
constituent traits, a point that will be elaborated shortly. All complexes of any kind have 
whatever traits they have; all complexes have their own set of actualities and 
possibilities; each is efficacious in some respects or other. There is nothing more to the 
question of reality than that, and there is no meaning to degrees of reality at all. 
Complexes can be said to have degrees in other respects, for example a complex can be 
more or less relevant or important in some specified way, but it cannot be said to be more 
or less real. An ontological parity is a fundamental principle of an ontology of 
constitutive relations.3
 For a relational ontology then we will avoid thinking of a complex as a container 
of traits, we will not assume that there is an overarching complex or system of reality, 
and we will reject the idea that some complexes are more real than others. These points 
now allow us to develop our definition of a relational ontology more positively. To do so 
we will introduce the concept of an “order,” by which we mean a sphere of relatedness. 
 First, it is important to realize that every complex is an order of traits, which 
means that every complex is the specific web of relations of its constitutive traits. Every 
complex has innumerable traits, some more relevant to its character, some less. It is 
therefore difficult, perhaps even impossible, to provide an exhaustive list of a complex’s 
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traits. But even a short, representative list can help to illustrate the sense in which a 
complex is an order of traits. A specific tree, to use the same example as earlier, 
possesses physical traits at the subatomic, atomic, chemical and biological levels. Among 
its traits are its physical parts, but also among its traits are its chemical interactions with 
its environment. Also among its traits is its place in its broader physical context, for 
example whether it stands alone in a field, or is part of a stand of tress, or part of a forest. 
Its phylogenetic characterization is among its traits, as are the uses to which it might be 
put, whether by insects, birds, animals or human beings. All of these traits, and many 
others, converge or intersect to form the complex that is this specific tree. The tree is an 
order of traits, the sphere of relatedness of its many and varied constitutive traits. The 
same can be said of any other complex and any other kind of complex, whether it be a 
logical principle, a fictional character, a piece of technology, or a human being. 
 If a complex is an order of traits, it is also always itself a trait of some more 
comprehensive complex, which is to say that a complex is always located in some order 
or orders. A tree is a constitutive trait of the soil in which it grows, for example. In so far 
as it influences the chemical makeup of the air in its environment it is a trait of its 
atmosphere. Perhaps it is a part of a forest, in which case it is a constitutive trait of the 
forest. Or perhaps it is an object of veneration, in which case it enters into relations with 
human beings in a certain way and becomes a constitutive trait of a community’s 
religious practices. It is an individual member of some class of tree, and therefore a 
constitutive trait of that class. In the case of the tree, it is a complex located in the orders 
of its atmosphere, a forest, a religious practice, and a species, and this short list is merely 
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a representative sampling of the ordinal locations of the complex. Its ordinal locations are 
no doubt far more numerous. 
 The example of the tree is meant to be generalizable to any and all complexes. 
Every complex, then, is an order of traits, and is itself an ordinally located trait. It is 
obvious enough how a complex is an order of traits, but it may be less obvious why a 
complex must be located in at least one order. The reason is that the ordinal locations of a 
complex are among the traits that provide its character, its nature. Without ordinal 
location a complex has no contour, no character, which is to say that it is not a complex at 
all. This is an extremely important point. First, it indicates why, as we said earlier, there 
can be no such thing as an overarching complex that is reality or nature. Such a complex 
would not be ordinally located, and therefore would not be a complex. An unlocated 
complex is a contradiction in terms. Second, the ordinal locations of a complex, its 
integrities, are what provide the complex’s identity as just the complex that it is. One of 
the persistent myths in philosophy of this kind, in systematic metaphysics, is that identity 
requires an absolute entity of some kind. The suspicion seems to be that if we allow an 
entity to be understood as the interrelations of its traits then it becomes difficult or 
impossible to ascribe an identity to it. But this suspicion is unwarranted. A complex must 
be located in orders of relations, and each ordinal location provides an integrity of the 
complex. The totality of a complex’s ordinal locations is its contour. Such an 
understanding allows us to posit the complex’s identity in the relation between its contour 
and any of its integrities. The continuity of a complex through time is thereby expressed, 
and in such a way that allows the recognition of ongoing identity through changes in a 
complex’s ordinal locations. A complex can alter its traits while maintaining its identity. 
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 Finally, these concepts and categories taken together help to avoid a good deal of 
unnecessary mystification concerning complexes. The identity and character of 
complexes is a function of its constitutive traits, including its ordinal locations. There is 
no mysterious ground of being required to understand this, nor is any source of being 
outside nature necessary. Complexes are what they are, they have the nature they have, 
by virtue of the relations among their many constituent traits, among which are their 
ordinal locations. With respect to any complex some of those traits and ordinal locations 
may involve human beings, but they also may not. In either case, the character of any 
complex is a matter of what we can call natural definition. A complex is what it is by 
virtue of the relations among the traits that constitute it. 
Relational Man 
 We now turn to human being as understood in the context of an ontology of 
constitutive relations. In Anglo-American philosophy discussions of human being have 
dealt more than anything with the so-called “mind-body problem.” This is a constellation 
of questions: Is a person a body and a mind? Are a mind and a body related? If so, how? 
Can a person be understood solely as a body? Can mental characteristics be reduced to 
physical characteristics? Is a person “essentially” a body or “essentially” a mind? How 
can a mind influence a body, or a body influence a mind? If a person is merely a complex 
body, how is intentionality possible? How can mind be studied? Can a person be 
genuinely creative, or is a person’s behavior simply a complex response to physical 
causes or behavioral programming? Are minds to be understood by analogy with 
computers? Some of these are questions that have vexed philosophers for a long time, but 
in their standard formulation they are misguided and unnecessary. 
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 First, from the perspective of a relational ontology there is no need to begin by 
assuming that there is an essential set of traits that is a person. There is no need to assume 
that a person really is a body, or really is a mind, for example. A person is the complex 
set of traits that constitute it, and of course the specific relations among those traits. One 
could offer at least a partial list of those traits, though that in itself would not be 
philosophically illuminating. Certainly a person has physical and mental traits. Our 
bodies have physical characteristics and react to physical stimuli. We think, speculate, 
decide, and perform a range of other mental activities. We also have emotional traits, and 
we have social traits. We have spiritual traits, religious aspirations and erotic impulses. 
We are to some extent political animals, as Aristotle had it, and we have economic 
motivations. We have ethical dimensions as well as aesthetic. A person is all of these 
things, to some degree or other. 
 The traditional approaches to understanding human nature, especially through the 
philosophical mind-body problem, have tended to try to assert some priority among these 
and other human traits. The assumption seems to have been that there must be something, 
some essential trait or subset of traits, that makes something a person, and that it is the 
philosopher’s task to determine what that is. However, once we give up this assumption, 
and instead say that a person, like any other complex of nature, is constituted by the 
relations among its traits, many of the problems and questions of traditional philosophies 
of human nature, and certainly of the mind-body problem, become moot. 
 Among the most damaging, in fact perverse, aspects of traditional Anglo-
American philosophy of mind, philosophy of human being has been its tendency to 
reductionism. Philosophers have relentlessly attempted to show that what seem to be 
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rather obvious characteristics of human being are in fact illusory. Along these lines it has 
been argued that what appear to be mental characteristics can in fact be understood in 
purely physical terms, or that what appear to be volitions are in fact merely effects of 
physical or mental causes, or that what appear to be ethical judgments or commitments 
are in fact nothing other than the results of fairly complex behavioral conditioning. The 
tendency to reductionism, however, is analogous to the inclination at the level of 
systematic metaphysics to insist on ontological priority. But a relational ontology 
suggests that there is no good reason, in fact it is meaningless, to hold that some 
complexes or kinds of complexes are more real than others. Similarly, there is no good 
reason to assert or insist that some identifiable traits of human being are “really” 
something else: the mental really the physical, or the ethical really the behavioral, or the 
behavioral really the neuro-chemical. A relational ontology is a tolerant ontology, and it 
is no less tolerant with respect to human nature. The reductionist tendencies of mind-
body philosophers are unnecessary and unfounded. We are fully justified in accepting as 
relevant any and all traits of a person that can be observed, described or articulated. In 
fact we are able to appreciate more fully the range of traits that constitute a person, and 
by implication the complexity and richness of human life, when we avoid reductionism 
and accept at more or less face value the fact that a person, like any other complex, is 
constituted by numerous traits of various kinds in a range of relations with one another. 
An ontology of constitutive relations provides the conceptual categories through which 
such a view of human being is plausible, intelligible and fruitful. 
 One of the reasons philosophers have wanted to locate some kind of essential 
character or trait of human beings, whether it be mental, physical or spiritual, is the 
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prevalent assumption that identity requires an absolute, i.e. non-relational, ground, or to 
use older metaphysical language, a substance of some kind. Without some sort of unique, 
even atomistic entity, for example mind or spirit, many philosophers have thought, there 
would be no way to ascribe identity, no way to individuate a particular person. 
Materialists, at least of the reductionist variety, have been content to ascribe identity to a 
complex physical entity, a body, which despite its changes over time, can nonetheless 
serve to individuate persons. This materialist approach to identity is interesting, in part 
because in fact it entertains, though in too narrow a way, an important point: identity does 
not require an absolute entity. The materialist’s mistake has been to combine this insight 
with its reductionism, whereby he insists that rather obvious human characteristics such 
as mental activity must really be something physical. When shorn of this unjustified and 
stultifying approach, however, a more sensible understanding of identity emerges. Just as 
a complex human body can be individuated despite constant change over time, and given 
the relational nature of material traits, it is equally possible to ascribe identity to human 
individuals when their more varied traits are introduced. In other words, personal identity 
in all its richness can be posited in the ongoing relation between the ordinal locations of 
its traits, i.e. its integrities, and its gross integrity or contour. The many traits of an 
individual, indeed an individual’s life as a whole, prevail in numerous orders of relations. 
Like any other complex, the specific sets of relations of a given human individual are its 
identity, and allow for its individuation. No absolute entity is necessary, nor is it useful or 
necessary to analyze away its complexity. 
 So far, we have suggested the plausibility of understanding a person in terms of 
the categories of a general relational ontology. But how, we may ask, does this help us to 
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understand what is distinctive about human beings? What, at the most general level, is 
uniquely characteristic of human complexes as opposed to other kinds? Much can be said 
about this, and much has already been said.4 For example, all temporal complexes prevail 
through some period of time, but individual human lives do not merely persist through 
time, rather they have a trajectory. Persons do not simply act and react, nor do they 
simply undergo. Rather, humans experience and they judge. Complexes that merely act 
and react, or merely undergo, accumulate events, all of which are more or less relevant to 
their overall character or identity. For persons, by contrast, experience is cumulative; it 
confers on a person’s life a direction, a trajectory. The trajectory of a person’s life is not 
necessarily unidirectional, nor, presumably, is it preordained. It is rather, the cumulative 
experience of that which a person undergoes and that which a person does. 
 Furthermore, persons act in ways that are, as far as we can tell, different from the 
ways in which most other advanced animals act. Specifically, they judge, which is to say 
they select. There are, it would appear, other very advanced animals that also select, but 
persons do so in far more sophisticated ways. Human judgment, whether it be assertive, 
exhibitive or active, manipulates other complexes of the world, other elements of 
experience, for reasons and to achieve specific ends. In many cases the ends of 
judgments, and the means of judgment through which those ends are achieved, are unique 
to persons. Persons can manipulate complexes in order to solve mundane problems, but 
then so too can many other animals. Other animals, however, do not render judgments in 
order, for example, to understand or to express. And other animals do not assert in the 
sophisticated ways that humans can, for example in literature and philosophy, nor do they 
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exhibit with the depth that persons do through painting or music. Experience and 
judgment are distinctive, cumulative, and constitutive traits of the person. 
 It is possible to select from countless common aspects of human experience to 
illustrate the way traits of human experience are constitutive of a distinctly human life. 
We could choose to consider various examples of judgment, for example, or we could 
focus on conditions in which persons find themselves and their responses to them. We 
have chosen to consider, by way of illustration of the way traits are constitutive of 
persons, the example of absence. 
Part II 
Absence and the Human Constitution 
 An illustration of the relational character of human being is the role of absence in 
experience. Absence can be understood in various ways and one of the possible 
interpretations of absence is rooted in Justus Buchler’s conception of possibility, in which 
case absence has a relational character.    
 Buchler views the notions of actuality and possibility as inevitable categories in 
terms of which to understand any complex, therefore necessary to understand human 
being. According to Buchler, every actuality has limits that represent its possibilities; 
sometimes they are called “powers” or “potentialities” (Buchler 1990, 42). However, 
possibility is not to be understood as incomplete or insufficient or “deficiently actual” (to 
use Whitehead’s term) in comparison with actuality. As possibility it is complete and 
self-sufficient regardless of its actualization. Treating possibilities as certain kinds of 
conditions for actualities and — taken together with actualities — as conditions of the 
“natural definition” of the boundaries or limits of a natural complex,5 Buchler 
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distinguishes potentiality and power.6 For him they are possibilities that are mainly 
thought of as prevalent rather than alescent, and they belong to complexes regarded as 
agential, i.e. to individuals and associations of individuals.  
 If we consider agents, i.e. human beings, as natural complexes and ascribe to 
them boundaries defined by actualities and possibilities, including potentialities and/or 
powers, then the question arises what happens to a human being when some of his 
necessarily actualized potentialities, which, according to Buchler’s definition, prevail as 
members of a family or group, not only remain non-actualized but are eliminated from 
the area of possible actualization? For example, we can view as necessarily actualized 
potentialities of human being the functions connected with his biological structure, such 
as walking, running, jumping, watching, hearing, etc., or such specific functions as 
communication with the help of language, i.e. talking, reading, writing, etc. In the 
absence of a biological organ with a certain function, how is the integrity of such a 
natural complex, i.e. human being, achieved? A man without legs, of course, can be 
considered a human being because other characteristic traits of the natural complex 
“human being” prevail over such actual traits as possession of two legs. However, the 
absence of legs questions his ability to function like a physically normal person and 
includes him in the order of invalids. In Russian literature of the socialist realist period 
there is a novel about a pilot during World War II who, having lost both his legs, suffers 
from this absence and tries to adapt to his new situation. The absence of legs becomes the 
stimulus for him and determines, first, the character’s repossession of the lost functions, 
such as running, dancing, piloting an aircraft, and second, the formation through 
regaining those functions (actualities, or prevalent constituents, of a natural complex 
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“human being”) of a new identity in accordance with a previous one — the identity of a 
“real man” (the title of this Soviet novel is Story of a Real Man). Being marginalized, 
being transferred from the order of physically normal people to the order of invalids, the 
character, pilot Alexej Meresjev, who was in fact a historical person, returns to the order 
he is expelled from not only due to the regained functions (at the end of the novel he 
runs, dances a waltz, pilots an aircraft and fights against the Nazis in World War II), but 
because the absence of his legs increases the process of his self-formation, which is 
interpreted in the novel as the process of hyper-humanization. In this particular case we 
can say that an individual complex of the individual described was constituted, though 
partially, by a lack or absence of one of the generic class of actualities (actualized 
potentialities) of the complex.  
 Let us have a closer look at another kind of possibility or potentiality, which can 
be constituent in a situation of non-actualization. In the instance of the Soviet pilot such a 
trait of the complex as the possession of two legs with certain functions is an attributive 
characteristic of the complex based on physical potency. Moreover, the capacity for 
walking in an upright position is one of the more common attributes of Homo sapiens. 
Among the attributes of agential natural complexes are its predicative characteristics or 
traits based on the social aspect of its existence. For example, the prevailing potentiality 
for a person of a certain nationality is the ability to speak his native language. However, 
when living outside the country or community of the native language the potentiality of 
speaking the language of another nationality can be actualized. This fact may or may not 
influence the national identity of a person. Consider an Armenian, a person whose 
national identity is strongly influenced by knowledge of the native language whether he 
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lives in Armenia or in the Diaspora, and imagine a situation where an Armenian in the 
Diaspora who does not speak Armenian and, realizing it as a defect, does his best to keep 
his Armenian identity (i.e. to be in an order of Armenians). In this case we will have an 
example of the natural complex where absence, i.e. of the ability to speak Armenian, is 
actualized and therefore becomes an important constituent factor of the complex.  
 The third and the last example is a case of an imposter or an “as if personality,” 
which usually falls in the same category as an imposter. An imposter, a person who 
adopts another’s identity or rank, and an “as if personality,” both demonstrate 
insufficiency of their own identity, i.e. some lack or absence of vitally important traits 
that they try to mask or to overcome with the help of the personality whose traits and way 
of behavior they mimic and imitate. An imposter and an “as if personality,” if they are 
viewed as natural complexes, do not actualize the potentialities either prevalent or 
alescent in their own complexes, but change the orders they are in for the order of another 
personality. They just “move” into a new ordinal location. However, neither an imposter 
nor an “as if personality” reject completely the orders they were in. There is a kind of gap 
between their previous and present state, between true and false identity — the “trace” in 
Derrida’s terminology that signals the presence of absence. Thus the example shows, like 
the previous ones, the constitutional character of a lack. The notion of a lack and distance 
between true and false identities distinguish an imposter and an “as if personality” from 
pathological cases of complete loss of the previous identity, when the notion of a lack and 
distance are not experienced. 
 The given examples share an actualized presence of absence, though viewed in 
different aspects: as a lack or absence of a physical (the case of a man with his legs 
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amputated), or social (the case of an Armenian who does not speak Armenian), or 
individual (the case of an imposter or “as if personality”) potency of an agential natural 
complex “human being” that is, consequently, constitutional on the level of biological, 
social or individual organization.  
 Buchler claims that complexes differ in their “potentialities,” which like powers 
are kinds of possibilities and, therefore, complexes differ in their possibilities (Buchler 
1990, 141). At the same time the encounter with a possibility itself is an actuality (Ibid, 
149). As a result Buchler comes to the conclusion that “a potentiality is not an actuality; 
but the ‘possession’ of a potentiality, say by a living creature, is an actuality” (Ibid, 152). 
Thus the possession of such potentialities as walking or speaking the native language, and 
the possession of a national identity, are actualities. It is then logical to suggest that the 
absence of such “possession” is an actuality as well, but one that does not necessarily 
generate a separate complex. According to Buchler, we can never determine where the 
boundaries of the order precisely lie, but that does not mean that there are none. Buchler 
states that “wherever there is commensurateness or mediability of traits, there is an order 
or complex” (Ibid, 97), and where commensurateness ceases, there is the limit of an 
order. The principle of commensurateness as it is presented by Buchler means that no 
complex is relevant to (determinative of) every other. For this reason the absence of the 
“possession” of certain potentialities is not an independent complex as long as it is 
commensurate with and mediates with the other traits of the complex. If we regard the 
identity of a complex as “the continuous relation that obtains between the contour of a 
complex and any of its integrities” (Ibid, 22), and view a contour as made up of 
 18
constituents, which affect its value, then it is necessary to include actualized absence or 
an actualized lack of potentiality into the score of the integrities that shape the contour.  
 Buchler is known to have several common points in his conception of natural 
possibility with Nicholas Rescher. Thus, for Buchler a system of rules and specifications 
constitute the boundaries of the order within which the statements are free of 
contradiction, as contradictory actualities cannot prevail in the same order (Ibid, 138). 
Rescher on his part distinguishes strong and weak contradictions and argues against the 
capacity of strong contradiction7 to be an ontological foundation of a world picture 
(Rescher 1988, 75). Yet Rescher is criticized for understanding reference to the possible 
as reference to the hypothetical and, hence, for ignoring the notion of casual connection 
as fundamental to dispositions. Rescher’s appeal to hypothetic possibility differentiates 
him from Buchler, for whom the notion of cause is linked with the notion of natural 
possibilities (Weiss 1991, 152).8 Still Rescher has some advantage due to the system of 
micro-worlds he uses in his analysis. For Rescher a “micro-world” is, for example, an 
actual world with three properties: F, G, and H, and two individuals x1 and x2, and gives 
for them the following canonical descriptions: ‘x1 is the H which does not have G’ and 
‘x2 is the H which does have G’ (Rescher 1975, 46—63; cited: Weiss 1991, 153—154). 
This is an example of hypothetical actuality. According to Rescher, possible individuals 
are constructed by logically permitted combinations, while possible worlds are 
constructed by logically and metaphysically permitted combinations of possible 
individuals, and then possibilities are just permitted combinations. Rescher’s conception, 
though it does not coordinate actualities and possibilities, takes into consideration the 
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constitutional character of absence in the world of possibilities lacking in Buchler’s 
conception of natural possibility. 
 In the psychoanalytical tradition represented by Jacques Lacan’s interpretation of 
Sigmund Freud’s works (e.g. Beyond the Pleasure Principle), absence or a lack constitute 
human experience initiating the desire for that which one lacks. For Lacan the first step in 
development of subjectiveness is desire; what precedes subjectiveness is pure absence. 
When a lack is visible or absence is felt, then it provides for the constitution or self-
formation of the subject who is aware of the lack or absence. In Freud’s famous analysis 
of his grandson’s playing with a toy and greeting its comings and goings with the words 
Fort! Da!, the realization of absence or loss constitutes the subject of the Fort! Da! game. 
In Lacan’s interpretation the subject (Freud’s grandson) is expelled from the subjectivity 
of total presence.9 According to Wilden, “Lacan sees this phonemic opposition as 
directly related not to any specific German words but rather to the binary opposition of 
presence and absence in the child’s world” (Wilden 1968, 163). Lacan argues that the 
“lack of object” is a gap in the signifying chain that the subject is to fill at the level of 
signifier.10  Speech is viewed as an attempt to fill gaps without which the speech could 
not be articulated and hence is connected with the notion of a lack, as in the theory of 
desire. Freud’s grandson in his game substitutes the lack of object (at one level of 
interpretation it is the mother’s breast; at another, the mother’s comings and goings), on 
the one hand, with words, with speech; on the other hand, with a toy (which is considered 
to substitute for the more primordial object).  
 The relationship between fantasy, signifier, and absence is basic for Lacan’s 
theory of desire. However, there are two principal versions of absence rooted in a lack of 
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the primordial object. The first type is absence of an object or a subject, which is different 
from the subject of perception (the mother, a toy in a child’s perception). The second type 
is absence or a lack of the part of a subject of perception himself. In the first case we deal 
with different natural complexes. In the second case we deal with a lack within the 
contour of the same natural complex.11 The lack of the object in the Lacanian sense can 
also be interpreted as castration. Castration is a lack within the same agential order or 
natural complex. If we turn back to the literary examples then a lack of physical potency 
caused by the loss of some organ, like the loss of legs by a Soviet pilot Meresjev or the 
loss of the nose in a story of the 19th century Russian writer Nikolaj Gogol’, serves more 
or less as representations of castration. The struggle of a castrated individual for 
prevalence in the order of physically normal people reflects the universal subconscious 
castration anxiety.  
 The notion of a lack within the contour of the same agential natural complex 
“human being” as a constituent of the complex correlates with the ideas of German 
philosophical anthropologists, in the first place, of Arnold Gehlen and of Helmuth 
Plessner. Yet for Max Scheler, a pioneer of philosophical anthropology, man begins with 
general and universal self-negation represented by the dreams of a new-born child 
(Scheler 1994). Thus, the creation of a human being originates in absence. Helmuth 
Plessner too held that human being is characterized by a lack or deficit, which in turn 
serves as a stimulus for the person’s activity and the trajectory of his experience. Thus, he 
listed as the most important characteristics of a person such negative characteristics 
(minus-qualities) as instability, biological insufficiency, and historical incompleteness. 
The notion of deficit or a lack within his bodily being is given to man by the “eccentric 
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position” he occupies. Plessner asserted that while animals live out of the center of their 
bodily being, men live out of and into the center of their bodily beings.12 Though, due to 
self-reflection, they are also the center itself. The dual position of a human being — in 
the center of bodily being and out of it — is the “eccentric position.” Living out of the 
center of bodily being, like animals do, does not allow the creation of a meta-position; 
hence, only a human being is self-reflexive (his self-consciousness is regressus ad 
infinitum). Though distancing himself from his bodily being, man possesses it (Medium) 
as an environment (Umfeld). Man is positionless (out of place — ortlos and out of time 
— zeitlos) and, for this reason, is capable of experiencing his bodily existence together 
with experiencing positionlessness in general. As a result, man discovers a lack within 
himself. According to Plessner, any living being, including man, is characterized by the 
initial dissatisfaction (Unerfulltheit); satisfaction is achieved merely by crossing a gap 
(uber eine Kluft hinweg). However, only man reflects on his dissatisfaction.  
  Arnold Gehlen too argued that the person is characterized by “die Hemmbarkeit 
und die Verschiebbarkeit der Bedürfnisse und Interessen” and, therefore, is constituted by 
the deficit of those qualities or traits that he has suppressed. Deficit is of attraction for 
Gehlen’s human being. Though several researchers before Gehlen (for example, Herder 
in his Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschhei”, 1784—1791) pointed out the deficit 
character of man, only Gehlen treated deficit as an ontological quality, which is constant 
and impossible for human being to overcome or to fill in. For Gehlen all the 
achievements of a human being demonstrate his initial universal insufficiency. Individual 
insufficiency in this respect continues the line of universal insufficiency of an embryonic 
structure of a human being. Distinct from animals, man acts with the help of non-
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instinctive planned movements and, therefore, is capable of actualizing potencies he 
possesses and is conscious of. The eccentric position of man, in the terms of Plessner and 
participated by Gehlen, generates planned movements aimed at achieving goals in 
prospective situations. Gehlen interprets a human “soul” as a kind of gap, which 
postpones realization of human needs and desires. Postponed needs and desires can be 
satisfied later or remain unsatisfied. Non-realization of any desire increases the general 
notion of dissatisfaction inherent in human being and creates a lack that can be 
interpreted as constituent for Gehlen’s human being.   
 While in the works of Lacan, Plessner, and Gehlen absence or lack create some 
kind of discomfort and conflict, Buchler’s conception of natural complexes with the 
formulation of concepts of prevalence and alescence suggests a reconciliation of any kind 
of conflict that arises. There is no contradiction and competition among complexes — 
just difference in prevalence and alescence of their traits: “A complex is prevalent in so 
far as it excludes traits from its contour. A complex is alescent in so far as it admits traits 
into its contour” (Buchler 1990, 56). Buchler argues against Alfred North Whitehead’s 
atomic theory of “ultimate actualities”: “No natural complex can be a metaphysical atom” 
(Ibid, 51). However, the conception of change proposed by Whitehead should be taken 
seriously. According to Whitehead, the goal of philosophy is to consider objects as 
processes and to reflex change. Whitehead’s theory demonstrates the relational character 
of every element in respect to the system and in respect to the alescent innovation of the 
system. For Buchler, though, process is also “distinctly a human movement, derived 
phenomenologically from an awareness of man as he is in-the-process of revealing 
himself” (Gelber 1991, 25). Moreover, sometimes, according to Buchler, a process 
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prevails “not as against another kind of process, but against the absence of process, the 
absence of traits such as continuation and recurrence” (Buchler 1990, 54). The inclusion 
of the idea of continuation and process into the metaphysics of natural complexes puts 
Buchler very close to the ideas of self-organization developed 13 years later (in 1979) by 
Ilya Prigogine. As maintained by Prigogine, the majority of complex systems (natural 
complexes in Buchler’s metaphysics) are open (there are no strictly defined boundaries or 
limits of an order in Buchler’s metaphysics) and the openness of the systems causes their 
misbalance and instability. As a result of constant fluctuation of subsystems (sub-
complexes) the system (a natural complex) may come into a state of chaos and 
disorganization. Nonetheless the chaotic and misbalanced structure of a complex system 
may then create an order consequent to the process of self-organization. Hence, chaos is 
the most productive state of becoming and new being. Absence or a lack create a break in 
the order and initiate fluctuations; therefore, within the natural complex “human being”, 
for instance, they lead to chaos. However, chaos initiates the process of self-organization. 
In the case of human being it turns into the process of self-consciousness and self-
formation. Absence or a lack within the same agential natural complex “human being” 
puts a human being into a patient position of an object suffering from the insufficiency. 
But then absence or a lack commences the process of self-consciousness, and self-
formation as personality is imparted to the Self by the comprehension of his 
objectiveness (Smirnov 1999, 32).  
The realization of absence or a lack is an act of eccentric transgression of the 
boundaries of the system because it makes the Self differentiate the order he belonged to 
and the order he will belong in case of impossibility to compensate a lack. Thus, a lack 
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excludes the Self from the former system and requires either adaptation to the new 
conditions of existence or to self-transformation. The primordial memory of “the non-
relationship of zero, where identity is meaningless” (Wilden 168, 191) causes the eternal 
desire of a human being for “oneness” and “wholeness”, and hence makes him seek 
intimacy at different levels of his self-organization (physical, emotional, mental, social, 
and spiritual) as a possibility to overcome his personal insufficiency, both real 
(biological) and imaginary. 
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NOTES 
 
                                                 
1 Throughout Part I we are describing in general outline the ideas more thoroughly developed by Justus 
Buchler, primarily in Buchler 1990.  
 
2 On this particular point see Justus Buchler, “On the Concept of ‘the World’,” reprinted in Buchler 1990, 
pp. 224-259 
 
3 The principle of ontological parity, though developed in detail by Buchler in Metaphysics of Natural 
Complexes, was anticipated by John Herman Randall Jr. (1962, 121-142). It should be pointed out as well 
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that Randall also anticipates Buchler’s idea that there is no world or nature as a single whole in “Empirical 
Pluralisms and Unifications of Nature,” which appears as Chapter 7 of the same book, pp. 195-214 
 
4 For a “metaphysics of human being” of this type see Justus Buchler 1951 and 1955.  
 
5 “<…> the traits of a complex define its contour (or, delineate a contour), and those [subaltern] traits 
which define or chart the ‘prospect before it’ are its possibilities” (Buchler 1990, 162); “We cannot say that 
a possibility is what ‘limits’ a complex; what limits it is the order of complexes in which it is located. And 
within this order, both possibilities and actualities are factors in the ‘limiting’” (Ibid, 169). 
 
6 A potentiality is representative, and it is discriminated as prevailing because of its representative status. It 
is a possibility in a family of possibilities. A power is a possibility that is discriminated as prevailing 
because of its unrepresentative status (Buchler 1990, 171172). “<...> the emphasis on the possibility being 
a power rather than a potentiality is the emphasis on its idiosyncratic or relatively unique aspect. <…> an 
acorn has the potentiality of becoming an oak, but not that it has the potentiality of scarring a toad on which 
it falls – this would have to be a power belonging to the acorn” (Ibid, 172). 
 
7 Strong contradiction is the situation wherein the significance of p is p and (—p) simultaneously. 
 
8 Rescher develops the conception of actual individuals and their properties; he claims that properties “must 
admit of exemplification, but they need not be exemplified” (Rescher 1975, 6). By that statement he 
equates properties with pure possibilities that may or may not be actualized (exemplified) (Weiss 1991, 
151). According to Rescher, a property may actually characterize an individual, it may be essential to an 
individual, or it may be a possible property of an individual. 
 
9 As indicated by Wilden,  Lacan’s interpretation is close to Sartre’s notion of desire as a lack and based on 
the common source — Alexander Kojeve (Wilden 1968, 192). 
 
10 “Through the word – already a presence made of absence – absence itself comes to giving itself a name 
in that moment of origin whose perpetual recreation Freud’s genius detected in the play of the child” 
(Lacan 1968, 39). 
 
11 The non-differentiation of these types of absence or, to be more precise, the non-differentiation of a lack 
as a constituent of a natural complex caused such rhetorical questions by Buchler as: “Is a male “deficiently 
female” and a female “deficiently male? Is a society “deficiently individual”? If so, should an individual 
not be considered “deficiently social”?” (Buchler 1990, 50). Buchler argues against using a lack or deficit 
as a distinguishing characteristic of the pair of concepts — natural complexes that are close to an 
opposition. However binary oppositions are far from popularity anyway. Yet marking a lack within the 
same order is of importance. 
 
12  Plessner, as well as later Buchler, is against body/soul or body/mind opposition – the model, fashioned 
by Descartes, which prevented “the reconciliation between man as a natural thing and man as a moral and 
intellectual being” (Plessner 1970, 29). 
